ating challenges to foreign sovereign immunity. Part I describes the FSIA. Part II discusses the competing interests at stake in jurisdictional determinations under the statute. Part III examines the approaches to discovery currently used by courts and identifies some of the deficiencies of these approaches. As an alternative to current formulations, Part IV suggests that courts should permit limited jurisdictional discovery against a foreign sovereign only where the plaintiff (1) produces some evidence of a basis for jurisdiction and (2) demonstrates that discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that will support a finding of jurisdiction beyond a preponderance of the evidence. This approach will allow plaintiffs to pursue discovery where discovery is likely to uncover facts sufficient to uphold jurisdiction, but it will avoid the burdensome "fishing expeditions" that result from more lenient rules.
I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Enacted in 1976, the FSIA provides the "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United States."" Although it enacted significant procedural changes," the FSIA left much of the substantive law of foreign sovereign immunity unchanged, codifying the "restrictive" view of foreign sovereign immunity that has guided U.S. decisionmaking since 1952. 12 Recognizing the expanding role of foreign states in international commerce, the restrictive view affords immunity only for the public acts of a sovereign and denies it for purely commercial
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The University of Chicago Law Review [66:1029 acts. 3 The FSIA codifies this modern theory, qualifying its broad grant of immunity with several exceptions. The FSIA's general immunity provision states that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States," 4 subject to a number of exceptions. 5 The most significant exception" denies immunity to a foreign state in general where the action is based upon a commercial activity that bares a connection to the United States.' 7 Although the FSIA did little to alter the U.S. law of foreign sovereign immunity conceptually, it introduced two important and related changes to the legal decisionmaking process. First, the FSIA sought to establish firm statutory standards for determinations of sovereign immunity. 8 Prior to the FSIA, foreign sovereign immunity decisions were made on an ad hoc political basis that offered little predictability to parties hoping to assert or defeat the defense. 9 Congress expressed concern that "[a] private party who deals with a foreign government entity cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's intercession with the Department of State."' See Tate Letter, 26 Dept State Bull at 984-85 (cited in note 12).
14 28 USCA § 1604. ,In addition to the "commercial activities exception," id § 1605(aX2), the FSIA withdraws immunity in any case in which the foreign state waives its immunity, id § 1605(aX1); in any case in which the plaintiff alleges the taking of commercial property in violation of international law or the taking of inunovable property located in the United States, id § 1605(a)(3)-(4); in any case in which "money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to... property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state," id § 1605(a)(5); and in cases alleging personal injury based on a foreign nation's role in torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking where the foreign nation defendant is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, id § 1605(aX7).
" See Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc, 504 US 607, 611 (1992) (describing the commercial activity exception as "[tlhe most significant of the FSIA's exceptions").
17 28 USCA § 1605(a)(2) (denying immunity where "the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States).
" See 28 USCA § § 1603, 1605 (defining "foreign state" and "commercial activity" and codifying exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity). See also HR Rep No 94-1487 at 1, 6, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6604 (cited in note 10) (explaining that the primary purpose of the act was to provide firm standards for foreign defendants seeking to assert the defense of sovereign immunity).
" See HR Rep No 94-1487 at 7, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6605 (cited in note 10) (In enacting the legislation, Congress noted that, "[ait present, there are no comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform parties when they can have recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim against a foreign state.").
"Id at 9, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6607.
Second, the FSIA transferred sovereign immunity decisionmaking power from the State Department to the courts. Although nominally vested with the power to determine sovereign immunity prior to 1976,21 courts made no independent determinations of immunity, deferring instead to the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser, which held quasi-judicial hearings on immunity. 22 By transferring the power to make sovereign immunity decisions from the State Department to the judiciary, Congress sought to encourage the development of a consistent and predictable body of law. Prior to the adoption of the FSIA, the State Department was in the "awkward position of a political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts." The result was "considerable uncertainty" for both private parties and foreign states. 24 Transferring power to the courts substantially depoliticized sovereign immunity decisionnaking. Congress hoped that by allowing the courts to make independent determinations of immunity, "[tlhe Department of State would be freed from pressures from foreign governments ... and from any adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity." 26 While the FSIA succeeded to a large degree in depoliticizing the process, even judicial determinations of immunity can engender political and economic repercussions, as will be discussed in Parts H and III.
II. THE CHALLENGE IN TME WAKE OF THE FSIA Although the FSIA facilitated the development of a more coherent doctrine of immunity, it presented courts with a new challenge: How to resolve often complex and fact-intensive claims of foreign sovereign immunity without impinging on the very interests that immunity seeks to protect. Unable to rely on State Department assessments, courts are now forced to develop their own means of assessing claims of sovereign immunity.
Two related problems complicate this new task. First, the FSIA has transformed the defense of sovereign immunity into a preliminary matter of jurisdiction, effectively forcing resolution of this complex issue at the earliest possible moment in litigation.' Unlike State Department recommendations, judicial determinations of immunity require a preliminary exercise of jurisdictionjurisdiction to determine jurisdiction-that necessarily encroaches, at least minimally, upon sovereign immunity." Second, the FSIA provides courts little guidance in navigating the complex legal and factual terrain of sovereign immunity." As a result, courts must often conduct significant factfimding before determining immunity.
A. The Pressure for Early Adjudication
In general, district courts must determine jurisdictional issues at the outset of litigation." 0 When the parties contest issues of jurisdiction, courts typically exercise their broad discretion to conduct preliminary jurisdictional discovery." Occasionally, when unable to determine jurisdiction at the outset, courts will permit litigation to advance as far as the trial stage until sufficient evidence surfaces to resolve jurisdictional disputes. 3 2 In the context of foreign sovereign immunity, however, the balance of interests is dramatically realigned. Unlike normal jurisdictional inquiries, inquiries under the FSIA necessarily implicate sovereign interests and often the inquiries themselves may impermissibly intrude upon immunity. Because "sovereign im-28 USCA § 1604. See also 28 USCA § 1330(a) (1993 & Supp 1998). The very exercise of jurisdiction, the hauling into court of the plaintiff, intrudes at least minimally upon the foreign sovereign's right to be free from the entire legal process. As the process intensifies from service of process to discovery to trial and judgment, the intrusion upon the sovereign's interests necessarily increases as well.
See munity is immunity from suit, not just from liability,' courts have consistently held that issues of immunity must be resolved at the very outset of litigation.' Consequently, in cases involving foreign sovereigns, courts have been forced to abandon traditional methods of jurisdictional factfmding in favor of more restrictive alternatives.'
B. The Complexities of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The normal difficulties posed by resolving jurisdictional issues at an early stage in litigation are exacerbated by the complexity and fact-intensive nature of claims of sovereign immunity. Courts and commentators have frequently decried the FSIA for its lack of definitional clarity." Significantly, the Act fails to define "commercial activities" clearly, despite widespread recognition that " [t] he determination of whether particular behavior is 'commercial' is perhaps the most important decision a court faces in an FSIA suit." 7 In the past, courts facing challenges to sovereign immunity have struggled over such difficult questions as whether an Iranian bank nationalized in the wake of the Islamic Revolution qualified as a "central bank"; whether state exploitation of natural resources constituted a commercial or public act;' 9 and whether socialist state entities, such as a Yugoslavian workers' organization 0 or a Soviet press agency," should be considered 42 Attempts by plaintiffs to prove an FSIA exception through the presence of complex alter-ego relationships 43 compound the difficulty of resolving questions of sovereign immunity. In most areas of litigation, plaintiffs rely upon alter-ego relationships in order to impute substantive liability; in the FSIA context, however, a demonstration of such a relationship can lead to a determination of immunity that often proves critical to even preliminary findings of jurisdiction." Furthermore, these relationships are often highly complex and typically require significant factual determinations. For example, in Hester International Corp v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 45 the Fifth Circuit considered a complex challenge to sovereign immunity based upon Nigeria's alleged alter-ego relationship with a state-created agricultural corporation. In finding no alter-ego relationship, the court probed a series of difficult factual matters: the extent to which the Nigerian government participated in the day-to-day operations of the corporation; the extent to which the corporation secretly represented the government; and whether any Nigerian government employees participated in the corporation's dealings. 46 Additionally, questions of jurisdiction are often inextricably intertwined with questions of substance, making it nearly impossible to limit discovery to purely jurisdictional questions. 47 In some instances, to assert jurisdiction under the FSIA, plaintiffs must proffer evidence identical to that needed to prove the substantive claim. For example, in Greenpeace, Inc v France, 52 the plaintiffs' attempts to prove a noncommercial tort exception to immunity' depended entirely on their ability to prove their substantive claim-that they were victims of the noncommercial tort. Proof of a substantive claim served as a prerequisite for jurisdiction.
C. Competing Interests
Courts must design discovery rules that will not only overcome these significant factfinding difficulties but will also strike a tenable balance between the plaintiffs need for discovery and the foreign sovereign's need for protection from litigation. On the one hand, excessively stringent discovery rules will deprive plaintiffs of opportunities to redress the wrongs of foreign state actors, effectively eliminating the exceptions to foreign sovereign immuapparent authority was essential to both a finding of jurisdiction and a decision on the merits); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v Vintero Sales Corp, 629 F2d 786, 790-91 n 4 (2d Cir 1980) (finding that "[i]n many cases a resolution of the substantive immunity law issues will be required in order to reach a decision on subject matter jurisdiction"); Upton 
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nity and fistrating the FSIA's policy of holding foreign sovereigns accountable for certain activities. On the other hand, liberal discovery rules may eviscerate foreign sovereigns' immunity from suit, undermining international comity' and the legitimacy of U.S. courts in the international arena.
1. The defendant's need for protection from discovery.
American courts have traditionally treated the concept of sovereign immunity as "a matter of grace and comity" -a recognition of the common interests of nations-rather than as a constitutional command. 5 6 As the international community began to abandon the classical doctrine of absolute immunity in favor of a more restrictive doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, the United States followed suit. 57 However, with the enactment of the FSIA and the concomitant shift in decisionmaking authority from the executive branch to the judiciary,' foreign states became subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and broad pretrial discovery practices. In struggling to define appropriate limits for jurisdictional discovery against foreign sovereigns, courts have noted two primary concerns. First, because even jurisdictional discovery is likely to be broad and highly intrusive when conducted against foreign sovereigns, the FSIA must provide foreign states with "not merely a defense to liability, but immunity from the burdens of litigation as well." 59 Second, overly permissive discovery rules are likely to engender international hostility and may undermine both 'judicial comity among nations"' and international confidence in the U.S. judicial system. a) Sovereign immunity provides complete protection from litigation. The law of foreign sovereign immunity is designed not only to protect foreign government agencies and officers from adverse judgments but also "to promote the functioning of all governments by protecting a state from the burden of defending law suits abroad which are based on its public acts." 6 Indeed, courts " International comity is, at its heart, a doctrine of reciprocity. It is a reflection of 'the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill. frequently analogize FSIA immunity to the "qualified immunity 2 that largely shields U.S. government officials from discovery and liability in cases alleging civil damages resulting from their good faith performance of discretionary duties." To be meaningful, the law of foreign sovereign immunity must protect foreign sovereigns, as qualified immunity protects U.S. officials, from all aspects of the litigation process, including the "broad-ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effective government."" Moreover, courts have long recognized that the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is rooted in a respect for the dignity of sovereign states and the judgment that the United States should not diminish this dignity by forcing the foreign sovereign to appear before a U.S. court." Thus, even an initial exercise of jurisdiction undermines one of the principles behind sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has warned lower courts to "exercise special vigilance" to protect all foreign litigants from the burdens of discovery." The Court has noted that "the additional cost of transportation of documents or witnesses to or from foreign locations may increase the danger that discovery may be sought for the improper purpose of motivating settlement, rather than finding relevant and probative evidence. " Because issues of jurisdiction and substance are often tightly interwoven in cases against foreign sovereigns," any jurisdictional discovery is likely to be both wide-ranging and intrusive. Determinations of FSIA jurisdiction often require discovery on foreign soil and inquiry into the domestic affairs of foreign nations, probing into sensitive political and economic issues. Challenges to sovereign immunity are often predicated upon proof of alter-ego relationships and, as a result, discovery requests will often touch on sensitive matters of political corruption, 70 relationships between central governments and industrial organizations, 7 and relationships between foreign governments and terrorist organizations. 2 Indeed, as privatization flourishes and American corporations begin to bring suits against the newly privatized corporations of China and the former Soviet Union, discovery requests will increasingly encroach upon sensitive issues of industrial relations, corruption, and political influence.' b) Comity among nations. While the United States' treatment of foreign sovereign immunity bears a striking resemblance to that of the international community, American discovery practices stand alone. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations explains, "No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States. " 4 Even greater friction can be expected when American plaintiffs demand that foreign sovereigns produce governmental mate- ("Foreign governments have often expressed their dissatisfaction with the wide discovery authorized under the Federal Rules, finding it intrusive and overbroad when compared to the European version of the fact-finding process."). As one scholar noted, "Foreign governments assert their sovereign right to control documents, witnesses, and other evidence located within their territory and characterize unilateral U.S. efforts to compel the production of such evidence in U.S. proceedings as infringements on their sovereign prerogatives and territorial integrity." Born, International Civil Litigation at 850 (cited in note 12). rials prior to even a preliminary determination of jurisdiction. Permissive discovery rules in the context of foreign sovereign immunity are likely not only to exacerbate the international trend toward blocking statutes 7 5 but may also "undermine the State Department's continuing efforts to encourage . . . foreign sovereigns generally [ ] to resolve disputes within the United States' legal framework." 76 Furthermore, by failing to give full respect to international comity, particularly where sensitive economic and political issues are concerned, U.S. courts risk harming America's diplomatic relations with foreign states." Finally, permissive discovery rules may encourage foreign states to modify their own immunity laws in a manner hostile to U.S. interests. 7 " As Justice Blackmun explained in a related context, 'The United States is increasingly concerned... with protecting sensitive technology for both economic and military reasons. It may not serve the country's long-term interest to establish precedents that could allow foreign courts to compel production of the records of American corporations. " " In the last twenty years, hostility towards U.S. discovery practices has led a number of foreign states to erect "blocking statutes" designed to stymie the reach of American judicial discovery orders. These statutes typically prohibit citizens from complying with U.S. discovery orders demanding the production of evidence located within a foreign state's territory. See " Soci&t6Nationale IndustrielleAgrospatiale, 482 US at 552 n 3 (Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing U.S. discovery practice in the context of the Hague Convention).
2. The plaintiff's need for discovery.
Despite foreign sovereigns' legitimate interests in avoiding intrusive and burdensome discovery, plaintiffs' interests in conducting adequate discovery remain strong." Indeed, two factors converge to make discovery particularly important in the context of foreign sovereign immunity determinations: the location of jurisdictional evidence and the high evidentiary burden that the FSIA places on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. a) Location of the evidence. Plaintiffs are often unable to prove an exception to the FSIA without significant discovery." s Proof of an exception to immunity is highly fact dependent 8 2 and may require evidence that is in the exclusive possession of defendants."
Determinations of foreign sovereign immunity frequently entail inquiry into the inner workings and political structures of foreign states.' For example, courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that agents of the Indonesian National Defense Security Council were authorized to issue promissory notes;' that the commercial activities of an Iranian charitable foundation located in New York could be attributed to the Iranian government; and that agents of the Soviet Union participated in the service and maintenance of Soviet aircraft used by the Polish national airline. 8 7 Absent discovery, plaintiffs are unlikely to have access to such information, since often it is not available in the public sphere. Without adequate discovery, courts will be forced to rely upon foreign states' categorical denials of liability (and as- ("[P] laintiffs do, in fact, have a right to conduct preliminary discovery in such cases if it is directed towards resolving the issue of whether FSIA immunity applies.").
" See, for example, Gabay, 151 FRD at 255-57 (Plaintiff's only evidence ofjurisdiction was inadmissible as hearsay, but it served to demonstrate that discovery would uncover admissible evidence of jurisdiction.); Millicom, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 at *23 (Plaintiffs argued that "only discovery can determine the full extent of the defendants' operations in, and contacts with, the United States."). sertions of immunity), leaving plaintiffs without recourse. Because strict limitations on discovery will force plaintiffs to rely exclusively on public information, discovery limitations may benefit politically repressive states that strictly control access to such information. b) Plaintiffs evidentiary burden. Although the text of the FSIA is silent as to burdens of-proof of immunity, both the legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretation of the Act have placed a high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs. The House Report explained that, although the foreign sovereign must produce prima facie evidence of immunity, "the burden of going forward would shift to the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity."' Courts have further heightened the evidentiary burden by requiring plaintiffs to overcome a presumption that the instrumentalities and agencies of a foreign sovereign are independent actors. 9 Because exceptions to sovereign immunity frequently turn on the strength of the relationship between a foreign state and its instrumentalities," this presumption presents a substantial hurdle in the path of any plaintiff seeking to overcome a defense of foreign sovereign immunity. 91 
EI. THE COURTS' ENIGMATIC ANSWER-LIMITED DIscovERY
In balancing these competing interests, courts uniformly recognize that discovery must be limited to the facts necessary to determine immunity. 92 " See, for example, Foremost-McKesson, 905 F2d at 447 (stating that "absent an agency relationship, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign state for the acts of its instrumentality"); Hester, 879 F2d at 176-77 (attempting to establish jurisdiction, plaintiff sought to prove exception to the FSIA on the basis of an alter-ego relationship between Nigeria and the National Grain Production Company In most contexts, district courts enjoy broad discretion to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is challenged, traditional practices afford a district court vast discretion to define the contours of jurisdictional discovery." This discretion extends to both the initial decision to permit jurisdictional discovery and to later decisions regarding the scope of that discovery. 95 Accordingly, outside the context of FSIA claims, courts usually will permit jurisdictional discovery whenever "pertinent facts bearing on the questions of jurisdiction are controverted, or [ ] a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary." In contrast, courts typically deny discovery where plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to conduct discovery yet failed to do so' or "when it is clear that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction." In the context of FSIA claims, however, the court must evaluate not only the importance of discovery to the plaintiff but also the unique burdens that discovery may place on foreign sovereigns. 9 While no court has explicitly embraced the use of traditional jurisdictional discovery practices in determining FSIA claims, ' an understanding of the traditional approach and its shortcomings is essential to understanding the insufficiency of the current alternative approaches to jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA.
Traditional permissive approaches to jurisdictional discovery cannot adequately serve the goals of the FSIA. First, because foreign sovereign immunity guarantees "immunity from suit and not just from judgement,""°' broad discovery proceedings may 'Trustrate the significance and benefit of entitlement to immunity from suit."" 0 2 Rules that permit discovery whenever "pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are in dispute" 3 are likely to subject states deserving of FSIA protection to burdensome discovery.
Second, traditional approaches to jurisdictional discovery are inconsistent with the discovery rules governing qualified immunity determinations for public servants. Congress intended to provide foreign sovereigns with immunity similar to that enjoyed by U.S. governmental actors." 4 Failure to limit discovery against "See Part II.C.1. "In a number of cases, however, courts in the Ninth Circuit have used traditional approaches to jurisdictional discovery in determining claims against foreign sovereigns. See America West Airlines, Inc v GPA Group, Ltd, 877 F2d 793 (9th Cir 1989) ; Greenpeace, 946 F Supp 773. In each of these cases the courts espoused traditional notions of jurisdictional discovery. Nevertheless, in each case the Ninth Circuit refused to allow discovery, albeit for reasons consistent with even the traditional permissive approach. See America West, 877 F2d at 801 (refusing to permit discovery where: plaintiffs discovery request were "largely unrelated" to the question of jurisdiction; the defendants had already answered plaintiff's jurisdictional interrogatories; and plaintiff had failed to request additional discovery until confronted with a motion to dismiss); Greenpeace, 946 F Supp at 789 (refusing to permit discovery where plaintiff could not show "any possibility that they might demonstrate the requisite jurisdictional facts if afforded the opportunity for additional discovery"). In neither case did the court recognize the need to provide foreign sovereigns with special protections. The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Phaneuf v Republic of Indonesia, 106 F3d 302 (9th Cir 1997), however, suggests that the court may be leaning toward adopting a heightened standard for discovery against foreign sovereigns. Id at 305-06 (noting that " [i] mmunity under the FSIA is not only immunity from liability, but immunity from suit," but failing to explicate any heightened pleading standard in cases arising under the Act). Thus, it remains unclear whether the Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to traditional discovery practices even in the face of foreign sovereign immunity.
" foreign sovereigns is inconsistent with this congressional intent. In the qualified immunity context, courts have invariably refused to grant plaintiffs discovery against U.S. government officers absent a substantial showing that such discovery was likely to produce evidence defeating qualified immunity." 0 5 District courts may insist that "the plaintiff put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations' that establish improper motive" before permitting discovery in the qualified immunity context.'e Similar protection from discovery should be afforded to foreign sovereigns for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court has explicitly instructed lower courts to exercise special vigilance in protecting foreign litigants from the undue burdens of international discovery and in respecting "any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state." 0 7 Second, in enacting the FSIA, Congress clearly expressed its intent to provide foreign sovereigns with a level of protection commensurate with that enjoyed by federal and state government officials. 0 " Third, although the legislative history of the FSIA illuminates Congress's desire to protect the litigation interests of U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign sovereigns,°9 the plaintiffs' interests in the FSIA context pale in comparison to the interests at stake in federal civil rights suits-the vindication of the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights."
Finally, the application of traditional jurisdictional discovery rules in the foreign sovereign immunity context conflicts with the notion of international comity that underlies foreign sovereign immunity." 1 By failing to consider either the unique burden that discovery places on foreign defendants, or the risks of abuse and intrusion that attend any judicial inquiry into the affairs of a foreign state, the traditional approach ignores the principles of comity and increases the danger that discovery will heighten the already intense international animosity towards U.S. discovery practice. ' Such animosity can only hinder American efforts to encourage foreign sovereigns to "resolve disputes within the United States' legal framework" 1 3 and to permit U.S. corporations to enter the previously closed markets of Eastern Europe and Asia." 4
B. Heightened Pleading
In contrast to the discretion permitted by the traditional view, several courts have attempted to define more narrowly the appropriate grounds for initiating jurisdictional discovery against a defendant who has asserted a defense of foreign sovereign immunity." 5 These courts typically stress the significance of foreign sovereign immunity and the unique burdens facing a foreign sovereign defendant. Beyond these general principles, however, courts have offered little uniformity in their discovery standards.
The most widely enunciated standard provides that discovery must be ordered "circumspectly and only to verify allegations of cation of constitutional guarantees"), quoting Ltd v Petroleos Mexicanos, " 7 which reversed a district court decision permitting limited jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff had alleged jurisdiction under the FSIA's commercial activities exception." The Court of Appeals criticized the district court's reliance on traditional jurisdictional discovery procedures". and noted the "tension between permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions to statutory foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign's or sovereign agency's legitimate claim to immunity from discovery. "" 2 Viewing the potential conflict as similar to the conflicts that frequently arise in connection with domestic government officials' claims of qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit demanded that district courts more narrowly prescribe jurisdictional discovery against foreign sovereigns.' 2 ' The court held that "[a] necessary prerequisite to an order for limited discovery is a district court's clear understanding of the plaintiffs claims against a sovereign entity,"' 22 and further explained that "discovery may be used to confirm specific facts that have been pleaded as a basis for enforcing the commercial activities exception, but it cannot supplant the pleader's duty to state those facts at the outset of the case. " " In Gabay v Mostazafan Foundation of Iran,' 24 the District Court for the Southern District of New York relied on the Fifth Circuit's approach, finding that Arriba's threshold requirement had been met where the plaintiff presented "an array of documents that, taken together," suggested that "admissible evidence might well be obtained if discovery were permitted."" Furthermore, the court employed a balancing test, noting that because the plaintiff's discovery requests presented little "risk of significant encroachment on a foreign instrumentality's immunity from suit," the equities weighed in favor of discovery.' 26 ""Arriba, 962 F2d at 534.
... 962 F2d 528 (5th Cir 1992).
.. Id at 534.
.. Id (criticizing the district court for "drawing an analogy to the usual procedure for resolving contested jurisdictional issues").
"OId.
Since Arriba, courts have articulated a variety of different standards for determining when to permit jurisdictional discovery in the FSIA context. The Second Circuit, apparently adopting the Arriba standard, interpreted the decision as requiring an explicit balancing test between the plaintiff's need for discovery to "substantiate exceptions to statutory foreign sovereign immunity" and the need to protect a foreign sovereigns "legitimate claim to immunity from discovery." 1 " The court demanded that the plaintiffs show "a reasonable basis for assuming jurisdiction" m before permitting them discovery; the court also insisted that any discovery be limited. The D.C. Circuit stated simply that "a district court ... must proceed with circumspection, lest the evaluation of the immunity itself encroach unduly on the benefits the immunity was to ensure." '" In contrast, the D.C. district court has established relatively sophisticated standards. In Millicom International Cellular, SA v Republic of Costa Rica, 3 ' the court explained that "[i]f plaintiffs set forth non-conclusory allegations that, if supplemented with additional evidence, would materially affect the court's analysis vis-a-vis the FSIA, then the court should permit limited discovery. "' 32 In Millicom, the court permitted the plaintiff to conduct discovery regarding the nature of the defendant's commercial relationship with the United States, explaining that "[tihese representations, the nature of which can only be determined through discovery, may well decide the question of whether the defen- States. " " Conversely, in Crist v Republic of Thrkey, " 4 the district court applied the Millicom test and denied discovery where the plaintiff's allegations constituted nothing more than "conjecture and surmise" 3 ' and where the plaintiffs failed to allege any specific facts supporting their theory of jurisdiction." '"Rafidain Bank, 150 Id at *4 (The plaintiffs, cellular telephone system operators, alleged that the Republic of Costa Rica and its instrumentalities prevented them from competing in the local cellular services market and the defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including that they were foreign sovereigns under the FSIA.). See also Crist, 995 F Supp at 12, citing Millicom. '"1997 US Dist LEXIS 12622 at *24. .. Id at 13. 3Id.
Although courts have articulated nominally different standards for permitting jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA, it is unclear whether the tests differ fRnctionally. For example, while the Arriba test calls for "allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination" 3 7 and the Millicom test calls for "nonconclusory allegations" that discovery would "materially affect" the court's FSIA analysis," it is unlikely that the Arriba court would permit discovery where it would not "materially affect" the court's FSIA analysis. Indeed, courts frequently purport to use a combination of the tests without recognizing any functional differences between them. 39 As one court has noted, "no bright-line standard exists" for either plaintiffs seeking discovery or defendants seeking to avoid it. 40 Although the heightened pleading standards provide greater protection than the traditional approach, they still fail to protect adequately foreign sovereign immunity. Judicial application of these tests remains largely unpredictable. For example, Arriba's requirement of "allegations of specific facts"' provides little indication of when a plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to trigger discovery. Many questions remain for litigants: Are allegations of specific facts sufficient when those facts would tend to prove the existence of jurisdiction? Is a plaintiff entitled to discovery when those allegations materially affect the analysis? Or must a court deny discovery where a plaintiff has alleged specific facts that are necessary but insufficient to prove jurisdiction? Arriba and its progeny leave the answers unclear.
When courts employ balancing tests, even greater confusion results." Balancing tests rely on ad hoc determinations of the intrusiveness of discovery and considerations of equity; therefore, they fail to provide parties with predictable standards for when discovery will be permitted. Indeed, some academics have suggested that balancing tests are predictable only in their tendency to "balance" in favor of jurisdiction.' As one court explained, "courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over foreign interests."' These tests frustrate the purposes of the FSIA and the general policies underlying foreign sovereign immunity. First, the unpredictability of judicial discovery standards is plainly inconsistent with Congress's intent to create "firm standards" as to when a foreign state will be immune from the burdens of litigation.' 45 As the Supreme Court has explained, "predictability [is] essential to any international business transaction." 4 6 Unpredictable discovery standards make it more difficult for U.S. corporations to assess the costs of dealing with foreign entities and decrease the willingness of foreign governments to deal with U.S. corporations. 47 Second, even the more predictable tests, such as the one espoused in Millicom, 48 fail to give foreign sovereigns adequate protection from intrusive discovery. Because courts have not required plaintiffs to possess actual admissible evidence to demonstrate jurisdiction, plaintiffs are permitted to allege first and prove second. Often a plaintiff-with no evidentiary basis-may be able to allege specific facts to demonstrate that discovery might uncover evidence that will materially affect the court's jurisdictional analysis. For example, in Gabay, the court permitted limited discovery where the plaintiffs allegations and supporting documents did not constitute evidence admissible at trial and were "legally insufficient" to defeat immunity simply because the allegations suggested that "admissible evidence might well be obtained if discovery were permitted."' As a result, plaintiffs often may be able to engage in the sort of broad-ranging "fishing expeditions" that FSIA immunity was designed to prevent. . '"Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506, 516 (1974) (discussing predictability in the context of international arbitration awards).
'"Unpredictable discovery standards raise the transaction costs for both the U.S. corporation, which must weigh the risk that it will be unable to seek judicial relief, and the foreign entity, which must weigh the risk that it will be forced to comply with costly and burdensome discovery. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 543 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992) (noting that unpredictable rules lead to suboptimal levels of activity because they raise the risk that permissible activities will be punished and decrease the certainty that impermissible activities will be punished).
"'See text accompanying note 132. '"151 FRD at 257. 'See note 64 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, these tests permit plaintiffs to reach discovery even where discovery is unlikely to produce evidence sufficient to prove jurisdiction. For example, the Millicom test permits plaintiffs to reach discovery upon a mere showing that discovery will "materially affect" the court's analysis; 5 ' Arriba permits discovery where it is "crucial to an immunity determination;"' 5 2 and Gabay permits discovery where "admissible evidence might well be obtained." 1 " Applying these standards, district courts have frequently permitted discovery only to hold years later that they never possessed a statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign.' TM Accordingly, under the heightened pleading tests, foreign sovereigns will be subjected to discovery whenever the evidence sought by the plaintiff simply buttresses his jurisdictional claim-even if that evidence is insufficient to prove an exception to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.'
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH Current approaches to jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA fail to adequately protect foreign sovereigns from the burdens of litigation in U.S. courts. What is needed is an approach that provides greater protection for foreign sovereigns and greater certainty for both U.S. and foreign actors.
Rather than permit plaintiffs to obtain discovery where they have merely advanced allegations that would buttress their claims, courts should permit limited jurisdictional discovery only where a plaintiff (1) has produced some admissible evidence of jurisdictional facts and (2) can show that there is a reasonable likelihood that discovery will produce evidence sufficient to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, unlike present formulations that simply require plaintiffs to prove that the evidence they seek is "essential" or "material," this test would require plaintiffs to prove that the materials they seek are sufficient to defeat a claim of sovereign immunity. Such an approach would increase the predictability of FSIA determinations and enhance the protections of sovereign immunity while still leaving the plaintiffs some "space for discovery. "" A. The Reasonable Likelihood Test Where the costs of litigation are asymmetrical--either because society values the success of one party more highly than the other or because the burdens of litigation are unevenly divided-courts and Congress typically attempt to adjust the standard of proof accordingly. 7 For example, courts have consistently required plaintiffs in corporate derivative suits" and federal civil rights cases 159 to state their claims with particularity before being permitted discovery.
In the context of foreign sovereign immunity, the costs of litigation argue heavily in favor of restricting plaintiffs' access to discovery. Discovery is likely to require defendants to submit to lengthy and expensive production of evidence, as well as impose political burdens on foreign actors." Plaintiffs, on the other hand, bear no similar litigation costs.' 6 ' Furthermore, while the United States has a strong interest in protecting its citizens and businesses in their dealings with foreign actors,' 62 it has an equally strong, if not stronger, interest in guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of foreign states." As discussed in Part H, permissive discovery rules threaten to impair America's political and economic relations with foreign states; discourage foreign entities from trading with American corporations and resolving their disputes within the United States' legal framework; and may encourage foreign governments to modify their own discovery and immunity laws in a manner hostile to U.S. political, economic, and military interests. operate to constrain the behavior of foreign state actors. For example, foreign actors must worry about acting in a manner that will hurt their commercial reputation, expose them to liability in their own courts, or persuade the U.S. State Department or U.S. Trade Representative to take action against them. 1 70 While the threats of diplomatic and economic pressure or reputational loss may not always be sufficient to constrain the behavior of foreign actors, the vast majority of FSIA plaintiffs possess far greater political and economic power than the run-of-the-mill Section 1983 plaintiff-prisoners. 7 ' Accordingly, the need for judicial intervention is diminished in the context of FSIA suits. Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts must "exercise special vigilance" in protecting foreign actors from the burdens of discovery.172 Thus, it is unlikely that the Court will find that a plaintiff's right to conduct discovery against a foreign sovereign merits the same level of protection as a plaintiff's right to vindicate his civil rights against a domestic government official.
B. The Reasonable Likelihood Test Adequately Protects Foreign Sovereign Defendants
The reasonable likelihood test decreases the burden on foreign sovereign defendants in two ways. First, the requirement of "some evidence" forces plaintiffs to make a substantial threshold showing of jurisdictional facts. Plaintiffs need not produce evidence that by itself would support a finding of jurisdiction, but they must demonstrate that some such evidence exists. This requirement prevents plaintiffs from simply alleging in detail facts that they only guess to be true. Plaintiffs must "have a concrete basis for believing that discovery will uncover the necessary evidence." 73 For example, both Arriba and Millicom would permit discovery based on a hypothetical complaint alleging that the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran was at all times engaged in commercial activity in the U.S. through its alter-ego, "The Money Store." Specifically, Iran's Ministry of Finance engaged in daily teleconferences with The Money Store's corporate leadership and directed their corporate activity. The proposed test, however, would deny discovery unless the plaintiff could produce some admissible evidence of the alleged alter-ego relationship, such as phone logs or affidavits from disgruntled Money Store employees. Thus, the rule precludes plaintiffs from engaging in (even limited) fishing expeditions unless they have some evidence of a basis for jurisdiction. 74 Second, courts can further protect foreign sovereigns by insisting that plaintiffs demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that discovery will uncover evidence sufficient to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Unlike current formulations, the reasonable likelihood test requires plaintiffs to do more than just demonstrate that discovery will buttress their claims: it requires them to show that such discovery will be sufficient to uphold a finding of jurisdiction. Thus, the rule precludes even productive discovery where the evidence likely to be discovered cannot prove jurisdiction beyond a preponderance of the evidence.
Some have questioned the ability of lower court judges to apply uniformly a rule that depends so heavily on ex ante calculations of litigation success. Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit criticized the reasonable likelihood test in the context of qualified immunity claims, arguing that district courts would be unable to apply an ex ante test consistently, undermining the predictability of the law and inducing '"more paralysis than discouragement of wicked actions." 75 Such criticism underestimates the ability of '"Brief lower courts to make ex ante determinations of litigation outcomes. In contrast to the judiciary's inherent difficulties in balancing foreign interests, 76 U.S. courts are well-suited to determine the likelihood of success on the merits. District court judges presently make similar ex ante determinations in a wide variety of contexts. When a district court rules on a motion for a preliminary injunction, it must determine whether the party seeking the injunction is likely to succeed on the merits.
17 Courts conduct the same inquiry when determining whether to designate counsel to represent an indigent plaintiff in civil rights litigation. 7 8 Similarly, in determining whether to permit discovery in shareholder derivative suits, courts are forced to evaluate the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claims at an early stage of litigation. 7 9 The last example is most analogous to foreign sovereign immunity, since failure to get discovery in a derivative suit would, in most cases, end the litigation entirely.
Any forward-looking test will invariably result in some uncertainty. Nevertheless, a test that permits judges to determine the likely efficacy of discovery provides greater certainty than the traditional approaches, which permit unfettered discretion; or balancing approaches, which force courts to act beyond their institutional competence. Courts are institutionally well-suited to making predictions about litigation success and litigants are accustomed to making such predictions; because both courts and litigants are well-versed in such predictions, uncertainty is minimized. Neither courts nor litigants, however, are institutionally adept at balancing the competing interests of foreign sovereign immunity against the need to assert jurisdiction. And, much like the situation posed by pre-FSIA State Department determinations of immunity, "considerable uncertainty results. "" In addition, present formulations, which simply require "allegations of specific facts" or allegations that will "materially affect" the analysis, engender similar uncertainties. ,' See cases cited in note 158. ""HR Rep No 94-1487 at 9, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6607 (cited in note 10).
not accurately predict the likelihood that a discovery request will succeed or fail where success hinges simply on a vague judicial determination that the request is material. As discussed in Part III.B, these formulations leave a number of questions unanswered for litigants. In contrast, the proposed formulation would permit district courts to utilize their institutional competence and simply predict whether the evidence sought will be sufficient to defeat defendants' claims of immunity.
C. The Reasonable Likelihood Test Permits Plaintiffs Adequate Jurisdictional Discovery
Although the reasonable likelihood test makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to reach discovery, it still provides sufficient room for meritorious claims. Though the plaintiffs must present some evidence of jurisdiction, that evidence need not be sufficient to prove jurisdiction by itself. In the typical FSIA case involving a commercial activities exception to immunity, the plaintiff is likely to possess some evidence that the defendant engaged in commercial activities in the United States. For example, the prototypical commercial activities exception cases involve contract disputes; 8 ' in these cases, plaintiffs will presumably possess some evidence demonstrating a commercial relationship. Moreover, plaintiffs will frequently be able to offer their own affidavits as evidence of the defendants' commercial activities or tortious acts. 82 Where plaintiffs can demonstrate that discovery is likely to be not only fruitful but also persuasive, this rule will not preclude discovery. True, sometimes plaintiffs will be denied discovery and will consequently be unable to sustain jurisdiction, but these are the costs of immunity.
CONCLUSION
Judicial treatment of jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA has been inconsistent. While courts have articulated a number of different standards for limiting such discovery, current efforts uniformly fail to accord proper respect to the sovereignty of foreign states. This failure threatens to undermine international " Outside of the alter-ego context, plaintiffs will often be able to testify personally. For example, in Greenpeace, 946 F Supp at 786-87, plaintiffs were able to attest personally to the tortious acts but were simply unable to attest to the alter-ego relationship. Ultimately, however, proving alter-ego liability is likely to be difficult under any standard. comity. International comity enhances foreign states' willingness to transact with U.S. corporations, secures similar protections for the U.S. government, and generates greater acceptance of U.S. discovery practices. Courts should attempt to define more clearly the limits of jurisdictional discovery and to strike a balance between foreign sovereign immunity and the interests of plaintiffs in adjudicating claims. In place of current limitations, courts should predicate discovery upon a showing that the plaintiff is reasonably likely to prove jurisdiction beyond a preponderance of the evidence and should accordingly require plaintiffs to present some admissible evidence of jurisdiction prior to discovery. This approach better protects foreign sovereigns from unwarranted discovery and accords more closely with international notions of comity, yet still affords plaintiffs adequate opportunity to pursue legitimate discovery.
